The idly browsing reader might think this is a book about ethics and practical reason. It is not. This is a comprehensive account of 'the relation between self, thought and world' (1). It is an account of this relation that explains its possibility in terms of our a priori Readers expecting a discussion of contemporary meta-ethics might be tempted to stop reading at this point. To temper that temptation, here are some highlights from the book that have a direct impact on the hot issues of the meta-ethical present. First,
contemporary meta-ethics has got itself into a serious muddle by confusing reason-giving facts (e.g., the fact that I am thirsty) with reason relations (e.g., the relation of favoring that the fact that I am thirsty stands in to my search for the sky-bar). The mistake of confusing reason-giving facts with reason relations partly explains the widespread, but mistaken, belief in all kinds of normative (including moral) realism. Second, once this mistake is exposed, the problem of understanding the supervenience of the normative on the factual is reduced to the problem of understanding reason relations. Third, the answer to how normative knowledge is possible is the same across the entire domain of reasons, from ethics and practical rationality at one end to logic and modality on the other. This is partly shown by combining a Wittgensteinian 'rule- In the following paragraphs, I spell out these claims further by focusing on five of the most important ideas contained within them.
In the next section, I then ask what we are to make of these claims.
The first core idea is that of a domain of reasons. According to Skorupski, there are three irreducibly different kinds of reason; epistemic, practical and evaluative. In each case, there are three basic reason relations, namely specific (some facts give a reason for something), overall (the reason for something given all the specific ones), and sufficient (some facts giving reason enough for something).
Epistemic reasons are the main subject of Part II. An epistemic reason is either a reason to believe something or a reason to make a 'cognitive transition', such as to introduce a supposition, make an inference, or exclude a supposition. Epistemic reasons exist relative to 'epistemic fields' (the 'maximal field' is the field of all the facts).
The domain of epistemic reasons includes norms of modality (reasons to exclude and include suppositions in eliminative inquiry), This normative competence is not entirely empty of content, since it constrains the way we must take the facts to be. Because this normative competence consists in our grasp of reasons, it is true to say that we have knowledge of facts only because we have knowledge of reasons.
The third core idea is that reason relations are irreal objects. The real is that which enters into causal relations, or 'has causal standing' (30). Facts have causal standing. We can think and speak truly about the facts, but only because we can think and speak truly about reason relations, which do not have causal standing; so are not factual; so are not real. If follows that we can think and speak truly about things that are real because we can think and speak truly about things that are not real. These 'irreal objects' are the objects of normative thought and constitute the domain of the synthetic a priori. We should not think of such irreal objects as fictions of our imagination or projections of our contingent subjectivity. Their nature is independent of what we think it is:
'Their objectivity is the unconditioned condition . . . of the possibility of knowledge and freedom' (30).
The fourth core idea is that of a dual source of knowledge in receptivity and spontaneity. According to Skorupski, our knowledge is based on two 'epistemic materials' (29-30). There are the standard materials provided by the facts as they causally impinge on our thoughts in our experience of ourselves (in apperception) or of the outside world (in perception). These are the epistemic materials of 'receptivity'. Judgments of receptivity are true, when they are, partly in virtue of the existence of causally engaged facts to which they are responsive. Yet our knowledge of the world is not knowledge of the world just as received; it is knowledge of the world as received and interpreted. This requires the epistemic materials of 'spontaneity', or 'self-determining thought's own epistemic materials --its spontaneous epistemic normative dispositions' (29-30). Self-determining thought determines itself by responding to norms (i.e., synthetic a priori truths about what is a reason for what). A spontaneous response is 'one that comes in the right way from, is genuinely that of, the actor . . . that is, from the actor's nature' (406). Actions, beliefs and feelings can each be spontaneous. Spontaneous dispositions need not be reflectively articulated (consider the laws of probability). Nor need they exist in 'harmony', in which case they may require reconciliation by 'free reflection on cases and consequences' (consider: 'every condition determines a set' (408-9)). All purely normative judgments contain a commitment that self-determining thinkers would endorse them in conditions of normative harmony. Thus, pure normative judgments can be defective either because they are shown to not really be 'spontaneous' or because they would fail to command the relevant kind of convergence.
A fifth idea, less prominent in Skorupski's basic formulation of the normative view, but just as central to his explanatory ambitions, is that of a self-determining subject. Agents are self-determining when they act from what they take to be sufficient reasons (508). Selfdetermination requires that one have the concept of a reason. It involves the reflective assessment of what one has reason to believe and whether one has reason to inquire further (this is 'self-audit' (508)). Self-determination does not entail autonomy, because it does not assume that the reasons to which one responds are reasons one correctly recognizes as warranted. Autonomy is 'an ideal of rational agency, whereby action proceeds from warrant' (506). The capacity for self-determination is a conceptual requirement of responsible responsiveness to reasons of all kinds, and therefore of all forms of normative accountability for getting things right or wrong. In particular, self-determination is a requirement of moral agency, for which autonomous action on the basis of a reflective grasp of moral reasons is a normative ideal.
How to Evaluate the Normative View
There are two ways of being led to accept the normative view.
There is the easy way, and there is the hard way. I'm not convinced that either way offers a secure path from initial neutrality to acceptance of the normative view. Even so, it is well worth asking where we might get to by exploring either route.
The easy way is the way of explanatory loveliness. We should accept the normative view because it provides the best explanation of how we are able to think, act and feel correctly. One serious problem with this route is that some of the core ideas on which the normative view is based are seriously underspecified. The case is perhaps most clear with the pivotal distinction between 'spontaneity' and 'receptivity' that marks the distinction between the 'factually real' and the 'objectively irreal'. What exactly does this distinction amount to?
One half of the distinction is embodied in the claim that the domain of 'receptivity' is the domain of the 'causally engaged', or that which has 'causal standing' in a broad sense (the intended contrast here is that between a narrow idea of 'efficient causality' and a broader idea of 'productive power' (500)). I have one question about this claim: what is it to be 'causally engaged'? On the one hand, this category needs to be generous enough to include both the objects of our experience and the various theoretical postulates of the natural and human sciences. On the other hand, it needs to be discriminating enough to exclude our responsiveness to normative truths. Each kind of responsiveness allows for true claims of the form 'She believes that P because P'. Yet some kinds of 'because' are supposed to be 'receptive' and others not. How do we draw the line without presupposing the distinction to which talk of 'receptivity' is meant to draw our attention? Perhaps the answer is to be found in our theory of causation. As it happens, there is very little to learn about the nature of causation in this book (the index lists 13 pages out of 525 where the topic of causation is mentioned).
As Skorupski knows, the theory of causation has an interesting history, with some philosophers having described it as 'the cement Yet in any given instance there will be some non-normative way the world is that obtains whenever a given normative claim is true. The reply will probably be that by taking this path we shall be losing our grip on the distinction between 'receptivity' and 'spontaneity' altogether, and thereby our ability to explain how our knowledge of the world is possible. That is another intriguing thought. It has been with us for a long time. Even so, there is genuine merit in bringing it back to our attention. [1] 
